



LOW ALTITUDE DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EFFECT ON MX SURVIVABILITY.

THESIS,

AFIT/GST/OS/81M-10 James T./Moore, Capt USAF

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
# LOW ALTITUDE DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EFFECT ON MX SURVIVABILITY

#### THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Engineering of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science



bу

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Graduate Strategic and Tactical Sciences

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# Preface

John Crandley, classmate and close friend, deserves special thanks for his contributions to this thesis. He suggested that we do a project in the area of BMD for Military Systems Simulations and that project served as the cornerstone of this effort. The encouragement and advice of Dave Lee and Joe Alt were a significant aid to me in the completion of the thesis. Dan Fox and Tom Clark, my advisor and reader, were supportive and patient with me; to them, I say thank you.

(This thesis was typed by Sharon A. Gabriel)

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## Abstract

This thesis investigates MX survivability when a terminal ballistic missile defense system known as Low Altitude Defense (LOAD) is deployed. LOAD will defend the MX missile with three high-speed, nuclear-armed interceptor missiles. This research determines a best strategy for the use of the interceptors. The deployment of LOAD with its best strategy is compared to increases in MX shelter hardness to determine which is the more effective method of improving MX survivability.

# LOW ALTITUDE DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EFFECT ON MX SURVIVABILITY

## I. Introduction

In the 1980s, the United States will develop and deploy a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This missile, designated the MX, is the first American land-based ICBM to use a deceptive basing scheme. The rationale for such a basing scheme is obvious: the missile is not easily destroyed if its exact location is not known.

Plans are currently being made to build and deploy 200 MX missiles in the desert valleys of Western Utah and Eastern Nevada. Within each valley, there will be a number of straight line tracks. Each track will connect 23 shelters for the one MX missile deployed in it (see Figure 1). The key feature of this system will be "preservation of location uncertainty" (PLU). PLU will encompass many carefully designed procedures which will prevent the enemy from determining which of the 23 shelters contains the MX. However, the enemy will be able to determine the exact location of each shelter (Refs 15, 26).

In the United States, the Army is charged with the defense of ICBMs and has examined the problem of assuring an acceptable level of MX survivability. If PLU is




Figure 1. Physical Set-Up of MX System

successful and the enemy does not know which of the 23 shelters of an MX complex contains the MX, then the probability of a single enemy reentry vehicle (RV) destroying the MX cannot exceed one in 23. However, as the number of enemy RVs targeted on an MX complex increases, the probability of MX survival decreases. As Soviet RV technology improves, the effectiveness of individual RVs increases and, with sufficient yield and accuracy, the probability of one enemy RV being able to destroy one MX shelter will approach one. 4600 attacking RVs would then be able to destroy 4600 MX shelters and the 200 MX missiles they harbor. Because of this threat, the Army is exploring ballistic missile defenses (BMDs).

The Army has studied several types of BMDs which could improve the survivability of MX. One area of emphasis in BMD has been the development of a terminal defense system for the MX. Terminal defense occurs during the reentry phase of an attacking RV's trajectory. Emphasis has been placed on the terminal regime because the atmosphere helps the defense. The atmosphere filters out non-threatening objects, provides wake observables to aid in discrimination, and slows down RVs. The terminal regime is characterized by a severely compressed timeline. There are only 15 seconds for the terminal defense to acquire, track, and intercept the attacking RV. This environment places strict requirements on the radar, computer, and interceptor of the terminal defense system (Ref 20).

Terminal defense is ideally suited to the defense of MX because of the leverage gained. Leverage is defined as the ratio of the number of RVs in the threat to the number of interceptors required to satisfy defense objectives (Ref 20:39). The deployment of one interceptor with each MX could double the number of RVs required to destroy MX (Ref 20:46).

One terminal defensive system the Army is evaluating is Low Altitude Defense (LOAD). LOAD would involve the placement of several nuclear-armed, very-high-speed interceptor missiles on a defensive unit (DU) which would be placed in one of the 23 MX shelters (Figure 2). Current plans call for the placement of the DU in a shelter close to the MX shelter, and in the event of an enemy attack, the DU's radar system would be used to determine which RVs were aimed at the MX shelter and/or the DU shelter. Interceptors would be launched at these RVs, but RVs aimed at empty shelters would not be intercepted (Ref 8).

Since each DU is expected to have three interceptors (Ref 25), a defensive strategy must be chosen which will provide the highest expected probability of MX survival. Three strategies are available. One strategy would require the use of all three interceptors for MX defense. Only RVs aimed at the MX shelter would be intercepted. Use of the first interceptor to defend either the MX or DU shelter is another possible strategy. The two lemaining interceptors




Figure 2. Random Assignment of DU and MX Launchers

would be used for the defense of the MX shelter. A third strategy would use the first two interceptors for defense of the MX or DU shelter and use the last interceptor for MX defense.

Variations in the enemy offensive strategy would involve the attack of the MX missiles with increasing numbers of RVs. Three methods can be used to accomplish this strategy. One method would be the launch of more missiles with RVs targeted on the MX shelters. Reloading silos and launching additional missiles from them is another method. The third method is fractionization. Fractionization is the placement of additional RVs on a single missile. The Soviet Union currently has the capability to place up to 35 RVs on a single missile. This is done by reducing the size and weight of individual RVs. A reduction in RV size and weight causes a concomitant reduction in RV yield (Ref 19).

In a recently released report, the House Armed Services Committee strongly endorsed the Army's LOAD system and urged the Army to expedite its program. The army is continuing its research and development program (Ref 18).

#### Problem Statement

The problem dealt with in this research is the improvement of MX survivability. Two specific means of improving MX survivability are compared. One is the deployment of LOAD, and the other is increasing the MX shelter hardness.

Hardness is the measure of a structure's ability to withstand increases in pressure beyond normal levels.

#### Objectives

This research has two major goals. The first goal is to determine which interceptor strategy provides MX with the highest expected probability of survival. The second goal is to compare the effectiveness of increasing MX shelter hardness to LOAD deployment as methods to improve MX survivability.

## Specific Goals

In order to accomplish these objectives, the following goals have been established for this research. They are:

- Construct a computer simulation which will compute MX survivability.
- Explore the relationship between interceptor yield and circular error probable (CEP) and determine their impact on interceptor effectiveness.
- 3. Examine the effect of RV CEP on probability of kill (PK).

#### Scope

One area of investigation is the effect of fractionization by the enemy on the effectiveness of LOAD. Fractionization is the process by which the enemy might increase the number of RVs on a missile by decreasing the yield of each RV.

The impact on LOAD effectiveness of changes in the yield and CEP of the interceptors is explored. CEP is an accuracy measure such that low CEP means more accurate. Obviously, the most effective interceptor has a large yield and a low CEP. For reasons other than effectiveness, a low yield and large CEP are sought. A low yield is desired so that the amount of nuclear radiation released in the atmosphere by interceptor detonation is kept at a low level. A large CEP is desired since the cost of the LOAD system increases as CEP decreases. However, interceptor yield and CEP must be at levels which provide the LOAD system with the ability to improve MX survivability.

A limited number of the parameters for this problem will be incorporated in the model. The parameters of the attacking RVs which are included are number targeted on an MX complex, yield, and CEP. Interceptor parameters included are number of interceptors per DU, yield, CEP, and strategy of employment. The MX shelter parameters are the sure-safe and sure-kill overpressure levels. Sure-safe level is a measure of a target variable below which the target will

not be destroyed 98 percent of the time. Sure-kill level is a measure of a target variable above which the target will be destroyed 98 percent of the time. Investigation of the effects of parameters other than these is outside the scope of this research.

## Methodology

The system science paradigm was used to develop the model used in this investigation. The system science paradigm is an iterative process of conceptualization, analysis, and computerization (Ref 21:297).

The programming of the model was done in the simulation language Q-GERT. This language was used because it provides for the insertion of FORTRAN subprograms and can readily incorporate probabilistic events (Ref 16).

# II. The Model

#### The System

The modeled system can be divided into three separate subsystems: attack, target, and defense. Each subsystem will be discussed individually.

Attack Subsystem. The attack subsystem is made up of the attacking RVs and the Soviet missiles used to launch these RVs. Since the MX shelters will be hardened structures, the Soviet Union is expected to target the shelters with a counterforce weapon. A counterforce weapon is one which has a low CEP and sufficient yield to destroy hardened targets such as missile silos and shelters. The SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs are two Soviet missiles which can deliver counterforce weapons. In the near future, the Soviet Union will have 308 SS-18 and 360 SS-19 ICBMs operational. It is believed that, in their most lethal configurations, SS-18s will be able to deliver 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each having a CEP of .14 nautical miles (NM) and a yield of 500 kilotons (KT). The SS-19 could be deployed with six MIRVs, each having a CEP of .14 NM and a yield of 550 KT. Thus, the Soviet Union would be able to launch up to 5240 RVs at the MX shelters using the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs (Ref 24).

If the Soviet Union planned to attack MX with RVs delivered by the SS-18, they could target the 200 MX complexes with 3080 RVs. To increase the number of attacking RVs, the Soviet Union could deploy more SS-18s, develop the ability to reload SS-18 silos, and/or increase the number of RVs launched by an SS-18 through the process of fractionization. With the ability to target more than one RV on an MX shelter, fratricide becomes a problem. Fratracide is the destruction of an RV by another RVs detonation. However, many experts believe this problem can be overcome by careful RV timing and targeting (Ref 6:34).

Target Subsystem. The target subsystem will be the 200 MX missiles, the 4600 hardened, horizontal MX shelters, and, if present, the DU and its accompanying components. Since each MX missile will be hidden in one of 23 shelters, one MX missile will represent 23 aimpoints. The distance between shelters should be approximately 7000 feet, and this spacing should prevent the destruction of more than one shelter by an attacking RV (Ref 13:14). Each shelter will be a hardened structure, and the hardness of a shelter will depend on the shelter's design. If a shelter is built with four roof portals to allow Soviet verification in accordance with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks agreements, the MX shelter's expected hardness to overpressure would be 600 pounds per square inch (psi) (Ref 12). However, if the design of the shelters is changed and the number of

roof portals is decreased, the MX shelter could be hardened to levels in excess of 1000 psi (Ref 10:58).

If the defensive subsystem is present, its radar network becomes part of the target subsystem. If the DU's radar network is destroyed, the DU loses its ability to defend MX. Several methods have been proposed for the defense of the radar network. These include a non-nuclear defensive missile system, mobile radar units, and deployment of redundant, dispersed units. Although each of these proposals has positive and regative aspects, it is felt that the DU's radar network can be made survivable (Ref 20).

<u>Defensive Subsystem</u>. The defensive subsystem will include the DU's radar network, high-speed nuclear armed interceptor missiles, and a control unit. Part of the radar network, the interceptors, and the control unit will be housed in an MX shelter (Ref 8).

The radar network of the subsystem might have three stages. The first stage would be an early-warning system which would detect incoming RVs aimed at the MX field. The second stage might be an MX complex radar warning system. This stage would detect incoming RVs targeted on the MX complex. If incoming RVs are descending on the complex, the last stage of the radar would begin to function. This radar would track incoming RVs and determine their target.

If the MX or DU shelter was targeted, the control

would determine whether or not its preprogrammed instructions required an interceptor launch. If interceptor launch is required, the DU would leave the shelter, acquire the RV with its radar, launch an interceptor, and return to the shelter. If an interceptor is launched, it would detonate at an altitude of 5000 to 15000 feet and attempt to destroy the RV with a shower of neutrons (Refs 8; 18; 27:1137; 25; 7:60).

#### System Variables

The system contains three distinct subsystems: attack, target, and defense. Each subsystem presents a set of variables, and each variable has an impact on MX survival. The major variables of each subsystem will be presented below.

The attack subsystem's ability to destroy an MX depends on many factors. The number of RVs attacking a complex, the yield and CEP of each RV, and RV reliability are important factors. Other factors include the RV's ability to survive the effects of an interceptor detonation and the targeting plan of the attack. The targeting plan affects the problem of RV fratracide. RV height of burst has an impact on the effectiveness of the attack. RV reentry angle and speed also have an effect on attack success.

Several target variables have an effect on MX survivability. Shelter hardness is an important factor.

Hardness depends on shelter design, construction quality, and type of soil in which it is built. Other target variables include number of shelters per complex, shelter spacing, weather conditions such as rain or dust storms, and number of MX missiles per complex.

Variables of the defensive system are interceptor yield, CEP, maximum speed, and reliability. Number of interceptors per DU, number of DUs per MX complex, and interceptor strategy are variables. The reliability and accuracy of the radar network are also factors.

The above variables are not independent. They interact with each other to produce the final result which is number of MX missiles remaining operational. Since an attack of this nature has never occurred, there may be unknown side effects such as earthquakes. A nuclear war can be fought only once, so the only reasonable way to estimate the outcome is to create a model which considers those variables which are deemed most important.

# Structural Model

The variables chosen in this system were selected because they were identified as being important in reaching the objectives and goals of the thesis. Certain variables were given a preassigned value. Other variables were made parameters of the model. These parameters could then be varied from one model run to the next. The variables are

identified with the appropriate subsystem in the following presentation. Those variables treated as parameters in the model are identified.

The attack subsystem's variables chosen for modeling are RV yield, RV CEP, number of RVs attacking an MX complex, RV height of burst, RV sure-kill and sure-safe neutron fluence levels, and RV reliability. The variables which are model parameters are RV yield, RV CEP, and number of RVs attacking the MX complex.

In modeling the target subsystem, the following variables were incorporated: shelter sure-safe and sure-kill overpressure levels, type of soil in which the shelters are located, number of shelters per complex, and the spacing between shelters. Sure-safe and sure-kill overpressure levels are model parameters.

Defense subsystem variables included in the model are interceptor CEP, interceptor strategy, interceptor yield, number of interceptors per DU, number of DUs per MX complex, radar network reliability and survivability, and interceptor reliability. The parameters selected in the modeling of this system were interceptor yield, number of interceptors per complex, interceptor strategy, and interceptor CEP.

The variables assigned fixed values became part of the boundary conditions of the experiment. The reliabilities of the RVs, interceptors, and radar network have been set to one. The goals of this research do not include an

exploration of the effects of reliability on MX survivability. It is assumed that the radar network will be deployed in such a fashion so that the system will be survivable in a nuclear environment. If the defensive subsystem is present, the number of interceptors per DU is three, the number of DUs per MX complex is one, the number of MX missiles per complex is one, and each MX complex has 23 shelters. These values are based on current Department of Defense plans (Refs 25, 26). The height of burst of incoming RVs has been set at zero. That is, the RV is detonated by surface contact. The reason for this is that a surface burst is required to destroy hardened targets such as MX shelters (Ref 11:93). Sure-kill and sure-safe neutron fluence levels of the RVs have been set at 10<sup>17</sup> and 10<sup>13</sup> neutrons per square centimeter (n/cm<sup>2</sup>), respectively. Actual levels would depend upon the design and make-up of the attacking RVs. 1017 n/cm2 is a reasonable estimate of the sure-kill fluence of an RV. The sure-safe estimate is based upon the fact that neutron fluence levels for aircraft are approximately the sure-kill fluence levels divided by 10 (Ref 3). It is assumed that the MX shelters are built in dry soil or dry soft rock. This is a reasonable assumption because of the arid conditions which prevail in Nevada and Utah. It is assumed that the spacing between shelters is sufficient to prevent the destruction of two shelters by one RV.

The model provides for the choice of interceptor strategies based on the number of interceptors which will be used to defend the MX missile shelter only. Interceptors not reserved for MX defense can be used to defend either the MX or DU.

# Probabilities of Kill

The calculation of probabilities of kill (PKs) of the RVs and interceptors is an important function of the models. To perform these calculations, several assumptions are made.

The products of a nuclear blast detonated by surface contact are wind gusting or dynamic pressure, blast or overpressure, neutrons, gamma rays, thermal radiation, ground motion and a crater. In designing a hardened shelter for a missile, the effects of many of these phenomena can be ignored. If a structure is built flush with the ground, the destructive sideloadings of dynamic pressure can be avoided. Thick, steel reinforced concrete walls provide shielding against gamma rays, neutrons, and thermal radiation (Ref 11). The MX shelter should thus be able to withstand dynamic pressure, thermal radiation, gamma rays, and neutrons and shield the MX and the DU from their harmful effects. The MX shelters will be built with a suspension system which will prevent missile damage by ground motion (Ref 23). The shelter can be hardened to withstand high levels of overpressure, but these levels depend on shelter

design. However, overpressures in excess of shelter limitations will crush a shelter. If the shelter is within the radius of the crater created by the nuclear detonation, the shelter will be destroyed. Therefore, if a nuclear detonation can place excessive overpressure on a shelter or place the shelter within its crater, the shelter is destroyed. The model routines which calculate the PKs due to cratering and overpressure are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.

The detonation of a nuclear-armed interceptor missile within the atmosphere produces overpressure, dynamic pressure, thermal radiation, gamma rays, and neutrons. An RV reentering the atmosphere should be able to withstand the effects of thermal radiation as it is designed to withstand the high temperatures created by its reentry into the atmosphere. Overpressure and dynamic pressure have little effect on incoming RVs because of aerodynamic design and high reentry speeds (Ref 4). The material of which the outer shell of the RV is made should provide shielding from gamma rays (Ref 11:336). However, the neutrons created by the interceptor's detonation will destroy the RV if their fluence level is sufficiently high (Ref 7:1137). Thus the neutrons created by the interceptor's detonation are the interceptor's kill mechanism.

To use the PK routine presented in Appendix B, the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges of the RV when subjected

to neutron fluence must be provided. Their calculation is presented in Appendix C.

#### The Simulation

The model simulates the attack of the target and its defense by use of the simulation language Q-GERT. A listing of the computer program and the accompanying Q-GERT network are presented in Appendix D.

In the simulation, the specified number of attacking RVs is generated. Each group of 23 RVs is targeted on the 23 MX shelters on a one-to-one basis. Excess RVs are randomly targeted on the shelters. The MX and the DU, if present, are randomly assigned to a shelter. The simulation then determines how many RVs are targeted on the MX and DU shelters. If no RV is aimed at the MX shelter, the simulation stops, and the MX is not destroyed. If RVs are aimed at the MX shelter, the simulation continues. If the defense is present, it attempts to defend the MX and the DU shelters according to the designated interceptor strategy. If the DU shelter is destroyed, the MX cannot be defended. The RVs attack the shelter in a random fashion with one RV at a time attacking and defended against. The simulat: n determines the number of RVs reaching the MX shelter and calculates the PK of the attack using the following formula:

$$PK_A = 1 - (1 - PK_R)^n$$

where

 $PK_{\Delta} = PK \text{ of the attack;}$ 

 $PK_{p} = PK \text{ of one RV};$ 

n = number of RVs reaching MX shelter.

Using this PK, the simulation then determines whether the MX is destroyed or not destroyed.

## Verification

Verification of the model was accomplished by simulating two different attacks on a defended MX field and comparing the model results with results derived analytically. Attack one attacked a MX complex with 15 RVs having a yield of 500 KT and a CEP of 850 feet. This configuration gives each attacking RV a PK of one. Attack two attacked a MX complex with 15 RVs having a yield of 500 KT and a CEP of 1400 feet. The PK of one RV is 0.64 in attack two. The MX complex was defended by one DU with three interceptors. The parameters of the interceptors are yield and CEP, and each parameter was tested at four levels. The interceptors thus had 16 different configurations. The PKs of these

interceptors are presented in Table I.

TABLE I
Interceptor PKs

	CEP (feet)				
Yield (KT)	250	400	600	900	
5	.65	.50	.37	. 27	
10	.75	.59	. 4 5	.33	
20	.85	.70	.55	.40	
50	.94	.85	.71	. 54	

The formulation of the attacks and the MX defenses permits the analytic computation of the probabilities of kill (PKs) of the MX. These are presented in Tables II and III. The model was run 200 times for each set of parameters with shelter sure-safe and sure-kill over-pressure levels set at 250 and 750 psi, respectively. These results are presented in Tables IV and V.

The output of one run of the model is MX destroyed or not destroyed. This type of output is a Bernoulli trial and the results of multiple Bernoulli trials can be characterized by the binomial distribution (Ref 22:191). The binomial distribution can be approximated by the normal distribution if n , the number of runs, is sufficiently large, and p , the probability of MX destruction,

TABLE II

Analytic Results of Attack One

Attack PK with Given Interceptor CEP and Yield

	CEP (feet)			
Yielū (KT)	250	400	600	900
5	.23	.33	.41	.48
10	.16	.27	.36	. 44
20	.10	.20	.29	.39
50	.04	.10	. 19	.30

TABLE III

Analytic Results of Attack Two

Attack PK with Given Interceptor Yield and CEP

<del></del>			
15 .	. 21	26	. 30
			. 28
07 .	. 13	19	. 25
03 .	.06	.12	.19
	11 . 07 .	11 .17 . 07 .13 .	11 .17 .23 07 .13 .19

TABLE V

Simulation Results for Attack One

Attack PK with Given Interceptor Yield and CEP

	CEP			
Yield (KT)	250	-, O	600	900
5	.31	.38	.48	.56
10	.18	.30	.41	.50
20	.14	. 23	.30	.43
50	.04	.14	. 22	.30

TABLE V

Simulation Results for Attack Two

Attack PK with Given Interceptor Yield and CEP

Yield (KT)	250	400	600	900
5	.19	.21	.26	.32
10	.10	.16	.23	.29
20	.07	.13	.16	. 24
. 50	. 04	.07	.12	.16

is close to one-half. In general, the approximation is good if np > 5 when  $p \le 0.5$  or n(1-p) > 5 when p > 0.5 (Ref 14:181-182). This is true of the model's output when n = 200, so the following equation can be used to define a confidence interval:

$$d^2 = Z^2 \alpha / 2 / (4n)$$

where d is the interval about the true mean,  $Z \alpha/2$  is the two-tailed standardized normal statistic for the confidence interval, and n is the number of runs. For a 95 percent confidence interval  $z_{\alpha/2} = 1.96$  and given 200 runs,  $d = \pm .07$ . Thus there is confidence that 95 percent of the results of the model will be within  $\pm$  seven percent of the true mean (Ref 22:191-192).

To test the null hypothesis that the PK of the MX computed by the model equals those found analytically, a test of hypothesis of binomial parameters was used. This test is based on the normal approximation of the binomial distribution. The hypotheses are:

$$H_0 : p = p_0$$

$$H_1: p \neq p_0$$

The test is:

$$\frac{x + 0.5 - np_0}{\sqrt{np_0(1 - p_0)}} \quad \text{if } x \le np_0$$

$$Z_0 = \frac{(x - 0.5) - np_0}{\sqrt{np_0(1 - p_0)}} \quad \text{if } x > np_0$$

and fail to reject the null hypothesis if

$$-z_{\alpha/2} \leq z_0 \leq z_{\alpha/2}$$

where

x = number of missiles destroyed in n runs

p = PK computed by the model

 $p_o$  = the analytically achieved PK (Ref 14:283-284).

 $\alpha$  is the probability that the null hypothesis is rejected when it is true and is set at the .05 level. Using this criteria, the null hypothesis can be rejected only twice in 32 tests made between model results and analytic results.  $\frac{2}{32} = .06 \approx 5\%$ . Therefore, the model results failed to compare with analytic results in 6.25 percent of the tests.

This is expected for a 95 percent confidence interval, and thus the model functions properly.

#### Validation

The system the model portrays has not been built. It is impossible to compare the behavior of the model with the behavior of the real system. An attempt has been made to include variables of the real system which are anticipated to have a significant effect on the probability of MX destruction. Here, projected real-world values were used in the simulation, and reasonable assumptions were used to model those areas where data was not available. The model was constructed so that the results achieved would provide information necessary for meeting the objectives of the thesis. Within the stated limitations, the model is valid.

# III. The Analysis

#### Research Design

The model is designed to provide estimates of the probability of kill of the MX when attacked by enemy RVs and defended by interceptor missiles contained on a DU. The model allows an investigation of the effects of different interceptor strategies and different levels of shelter hardness on the PK of the MX.

The effective use of the model hinges on determining the number of runs of the model required to ensure a desired confidence interval. A method which compares the results of the model must be developed, and the levels of the model parameters which will be explored must be chosen.

Number of Runs. Since the output of one run of the model is a Bernoulli trial, the model results can be characterized by the binomial distribution. The binomial distribution can be approximated by the normal distribution for reasonable large sample sizes. It can be shown that

$$n = 2\frac{2}{\alpha/2}/(4d^2)$$

where n is the number of model runs, d is the desired interval about the true mean, and  $Z_{\alpha/2}$  is the standardized normal statistic for the probability sought (Ref 22:191-192).

It is desired that the model results differ from the true PK by no more than four percent with a confidence level of 95 percent which implies  $Z_{\alpha/2}$  equals 1.96. Given these inputs, the number of model runs required is 600.

Statistical Test. The results produced by the model must be compared to determine which strategy produces the lowest MX PK. A test on the means of normal populations with variances unknown and not assumed equal is used to make the comparisons. The use of this test takes advantage of the fact that, for a large sample size such as 600, a binomial population is closely approximated by a normal population. The test statistic used is:

$$t_{o} = \frac{\overline{x}_{1} - \overline{x}_{2}}{\sqrt{\frac{S_{1}^{2}}{n_{1}} + \frac{S_{2}^{2}}{n_{2}}}}$$

where

 $\overline{x}_1$  and  $\overline{x}_2$  = sample means

 $S_1^2$  and  $S_2^2$  = sample variances

 $n_1$  and  $n_2$  = sample sizes.

If P is the number of samples in which the MX is destroyed, the following equations can be used to compute the sample means and variances:

$$\bar{x} = P/n$$

$$S^2 = n(P/n)((1 - P)/n)/(n - 1)$$

where n is the number of samples. The test statistic  $t_0 \quad \text{is then compared to} \quad t_{\alpha/2,\gamma} \quad \text{in the case of equality.}$  The hypotheses are:

$$H_0 : u_1 = u_2$$

$$H_1: u_1 \neq u_2$$

and the null hypothesis is rejected if

$$-t_0 < t_{\alpha/2,\gamma} < t_1$$
.

 $t_{\alpha/2,\gamma}$  is the two tailed t statistic with given degrees of freedom,  $\gamma$ , and  $\alpha$  is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. The  $\alpha$  error is 0.05.  $\gamma$ , the number of degrees of freedom, is computed by the following equation:

$$\gamma = \frac{\left(\frac{S_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{S_2^2}{n_2}\right)^2}{\frac{(S_1/n_1)^2}{n_1+1} + \frac{(S_2^2/n_2)^2}{n_2+1}} - 2$$

The number of degrees of freedom for sample sizes of 600 can never be less than 599. At 599 degrees of freedom, the t distribution degenerates to the normal distribution. Thus  $t_{\alpha/2,\gamma}$  equals 1.96. The one-tailed test differs slightly. For the case of less than, the null hypothesis,  $H_0: u_1 \leq u_2$ , is rejected if  $t_0 > t_{\alpha,\gamma}$ , and for the case of greater than, the null hypothesis  $H_0: u_1 \geq u_2$ , is rejected if  $t_0 < -t_{\alpha,\gamma}$  where  $t_{\alpha,\gamma}$  equals 1.645 (Ref 14:263-267).

### Selection of Model Parameter Levels

The parameters of the attack are number of RVs attacking the MX complex, RV yield, and RV CEP. Three levels of attack were used to test the effectiveness of the defense and shelter hardness. The missile assumed to be launching the RVs is the SS-18. Fractionization was used to increase the number of RVs delivered by each enemy missile. Through this process, the number of RVs delivered by each SS-18 was increased from 10 to 20 to 30 RVs to yield the three levels of attack. Assuming 300 SS-18s were dedicated to the destruction of the MX missiles,

the number of RVs attacking a MX complex would be 15, 30, or 45 RVs. When fractionization is used to increase the number of attacking RVs, the yield of each of the RVs must be decreased because total missile payload is constant. A SS-18 can deliver 10 RVs with yields of 500 KT each (Ref 24:70). The yield of a RV when the SS-18 launches 20 or 30 RVs was assumed to be 250 and 125 KT, respectively.

Thus, three enemy strategies are simulated. First, a low density attack which assumes 10 RVs per missile, each with a yield of 500 KT. Second, a medium density attack which assumes 20 RVs per missile, each with a yield of 250 KT. Finally, a high density attack is considered which assumes 30 RVs per missile, each with a yield of 125 KT.

The CEP of an attacking RV is critical in determining the effectiveness of a RV. Accurate estimates of the accuracy of enemy missiles are classified. The problem of making these estimates is summarized by Feld and Tsipis (Ref 10:54).

"CEP is defined as the radius of the circle around a target within which half the warheads aimed at the target can be expected to land. The rated CEP of any missile system is established in test flights, and it may or may not be duplicated in actual military operations. Furthermore, this measure of accuracy does not take into account the probability of systematic aiming errors. The CEP value for Russian missiles is presumably determined by U.S. intelligence experts from information gathered during Russian weapons tests by observing the launching of each missile and the return of its warhead (or warheads) to the surface. The U.S. Government, however, does not announce the results

of its intelligence-gathering activities. As a result the CEP values of Russian ICBMs cited in unofficial public statements... may be neither the values measured directly by the Russians nor the values determined indirectly by the Americans. Since accuracy is the most important determinant of a missile's destructiveness against a silo, publicly quoted estimates of the CEP values of Russian missiles are likely to be subject to powerful political pressures generated by highly motivated interests."

In 1978, the SS-18 ICBM was reported to have achieved accuracies of .1 NM (Ref 17). In 1980, the CEP of .14 NM was claimed for the SS-18 (Ref 24). There is evidence, however, that the guidance packages which achieved these low CEPs are intended for the new generation of ICBMs still in development (Ref AA:15). The CEP of the SS-18 is within the range of .12 to .25 NM (Ref 10:54). For the purpose of this research effort, the CEP of the Soviet SS-18 ICBM will be assumed to be .23 NM or 1400 feet. This CEP gives the SS-18 a hard target kill capability. The PKs of single RVs with the specified yields attacking MX shelters with sure-safe and sure-kill levels of 250 and 750 psi, respectively, can be seen in Tables VI, VII, and VIII. As CEP increases, the PKs of the RV drops quite dramatically. Thus CEP is critical in the determination of RV lethality, and a CEP of 1400 feet appears to be reasonable.

Target parameters are shelter sure-safe and sure-kill overpressure levels. If a DU is deployed, the sure-safe level is 250 psi, and the sure-kill level is 750 psi.

TABLE VI

PK of 500 KT RV Against MX Shelter

CEP (Feet)	PK of One RV
500	1.
600	1.
700	.999998
800	.99992
900	.997522
1000	.971077
1100	.88152
1200	.758423
1300	.673958
1400	.637124
1500	.622592
1750	.60421
2000	.583191
2250	.506442
2500	.361856
2750	.255757
3000	.215706

TABLE VII

PK of 250 KT RV Against MX Shelter

CEP (Feet)	PK of One RV
500	1
600	.999985
700	.998599
800	.966807
900	.840595
1000	.703604
1100	.64.3212
1200	.624145
1300	.614017
1400	.60572
1500	. 597088
1750	.529103
2000	.353
2250	.239186
2500	.208875
2750	.197688
3000	.189461

TABLE VIII

PK of 125 KT RV Against MX Shelter

CEP (Feet)	PK of One RV
500	.999938
600	.989792
700	.870304
800	.69885
900	.637437
1000	.620385
1100	.609299
1200	.598113
1300	.576071
1400	.523587
1500	.437327
1750	.253911
2000	.210214
2250	.196923
2500	.18719
2750	.179251
3000	.172635

When the MX is not defended, the following hardness levels were tested to determine their effect on MX survival:

Sure-Safe (psi)	Sure-Kill	(psi)
250	750	
500	1000	
750	1250	
1000	1500	
1250	1750	

The hardness of the shelters will depend on their final design and construction. Since they have not yet been built, their hardness levels are subject to change. Although a horizontal shelter can be hardened to levels exceeding 1000 psi (Ref 10:58), 1750 psi is chosen as the maximum hardness level because of the large surface area of a horizontal shelter. The 500 psi difference between sure-safe and sure-kill levels is selected as a reasonable guess.

The parameters of the defense are interceptor yield, interceptor CEP, interceptor strategy, and number of interceptors per MX complex. The number of interceptors is set at three because, under current planning, three interceptors will be deployed with the DU of an MX complex (Ref 25:26). However, if the MX is undefended, the number of interceptors deployed can be set to zero in the model.

In selecting the interceptor yields and CEPs which would be used as model inputs, the following criteria were established. A LOAD interceptor will be half the size of the Spring missile (Ref 8). Its size will limit the yield of its warhead. The interceptor will detonate at a low altitude and release nuclear radiation into the atmosphere of the United States. Because of the interceptor's small size and the deisre to keep released radiation at a minimum, the yield of the interceptors does not exceed 20 KT in the model. A lower limit on the PK of the interceptor is desired. It is assumed that an interceptor with a PK less than 40 percent will not be deployed. Given this lower limit and a maximum yield of 20 KT, it was found by using the model in Appendix B that a CEP of 900 feet produced a PK of 40 percent. Therefore, the CEP of an interceptor can be assumed to be 900 feet or less. Given these limits on CEP and yield, three CEPs (300, 600 and 900 feet) and three yields (5, 10 and 20 KT) were selected for investigation. The interceptor PKs for the nine combinations of CEP and yield are snown in Table IX. Interceptors with a yield of 5 KT and CEPs of 600 and 900 feet and the interceptor with a yield of 10 KT and a CEP of 900 feet are eliminated from further consideration because their PKs are less than 40 percent. Thus six different interceptor configurations are included in the modeling process.

Three strategies for interceptor usage are examined to determine which is most effective in defending MX.

TABLE IX
Interceptor PKs

Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	.59	.37	. 27
10	.69	.45	.33
20	.79	.55	.40

Strategy One allows the DU to launch the first two interceptors at RVs aimed at either the MX or DU shelter. The remaining interceptor will be used for MX defense only. If an RV is attacking the DU shelter and only one interceptor remains, the interceptor will not be launched, and the DU will be subjected to an RV detonation which may or may not destroy the DU.

Strategy Two permits the launch of the first interceptor at an RV aimed at either the DU or the MX shelter. The two remaining interceptors may only be launched at RVs targeted on the MX shelter.

Strategy Three does not allow the DU to defend itself.

RVs aimed at the DU shelter will not be intercepted. This

strategy confines the use of the interceptor to MX defense
only.

#### Model Runs

For the defended system, the model was run 54 times for all combinations of the three levels of attack defended by six interceptor configurations using three defensive strategies. For the case of the undefended system, 15 runs were made for three levels of attack and five different shelter hardness levels.

### Results

The results of the simulation are in the form of MX probability of kill (PK). For each set of inputs, the outputs are presented in tabular form in the following manner:

### X(Y)

where X is the MX PK and Y is the number of MX missiles killed in 600 trials. The results are shown in Tables X through XIII.

TABLE X

MX PK From Low Density Attack

DU Strategy 1

	CEP (Feet)		
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	20(120)		
10	18 (108)	25(150)	
20	13( 78)	22(133)	26 (153)

# DU Strategy 2

	CEP (Feet)		
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	30(120)		
10	18 (109)	25(150)	
20	13(78)	22(133)	26 (153)

# DU Strategy 3

	CEP (Feet)		
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	?2(133)		
10	19(115)	27(160)	
20	17(102)	24(141)	28 (167)

TABLE XI

MX PK From Medium Density Attack

DU Strategy 1

	CEP (Feet)		
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	36(216)		
10	31(188)	45(268)	
20	14(144)	39(232)	49(292)

## DU Strategy 2

	$\cdot$ CEP (Feet)		
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	40 (242)		
10	32(190)	50(301)	
20	23(136)	40(239)	52(311)

## DU Strategy 3

		CEP (Feet)		
Yield (	KT)	300	600	900
5		43 (258)		
10	İ	39(233)	49(292)	ı
20		34 (204)	45(267)	52 (313)

TABLE XII

MX PK From High Density Attack

# DU Strategy 1

	CEP (Feet)		
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	53(317)		
10	45(269)	53(318)	
20	31(187)	59(331)	59(356)

### DU Strategy 2

		CEP (Feet)				
Yield	(KT)	300	600	900		
5		48 (286)				
10		45(272)	61 (365)			
20		42(253)	49 (295)	60(357)		

## DU Strategy 3

			CEP (Feet)				
_	Yield	(KT)	300	600	900		
_	5		53(316)				
	10		48 (288)	60 (357)			
	20		43(259)	55 (328)	61 (365)		

TABLE XIII

# PKs of Attacks on Undefended MX Complex

# Low Density Attack

Sure-Kill (psi)	<u> </u>
750	41(245)
1000	41 (245)
1250	40(241)
1500	40(241)
1750	40(241)

### Medium Density Attack

Sure-Kill (psi)	PK
750	68 (406)
1000	67 (404)
1250	59(354)
1500	39(231)
1750	36(218)

# High Density Attack

Sure-Kill (psi)	PK
750	76 (453)
1000	47 (279)
1250	43 (260)
1500	43 (260)
1750	43 (260)

### Analysis

The statistical test presented earlier was used to compare the results of the three strategies. In the following tables, "EQ" means the null hypothesis of equality could not be rejected at .05 level. "LT" means the hypothesis of less than could not be rejected at the .05 level. "GT" means the hypothesis of greater than could not be rejected at the .05 level.

Comparisons Between Defensive Strategies. The comparisons among the three DU strategies when defending MX against each of the three attacks produced the results shown in Tables XIV, XV, and VXI. The results from Tables XIV, XV, and XVI are summarized in Table XVII. In Table XVII, "EQ" means the strategies produced statistically equal PKs. "LT" means the PKs of the first strategy are statistically less than the PKs of the second strategy. The "LT" thus implies the first strategy is a more effective strategy than the second. Table XVII shows Strategy Three is the least effective strategy. There is doubt as to which of the two remaining strategies is most effective. Strategy One and Strategy Two are equally effective against the low and medium density attacks. Against the high density attack, two interceptor configurations are more effective when using Strategy One and one configuration is more effective when using Strategy Two. The other three configurations are equally effective using either strategy. Rather than guess at which strategy

Comparison of DU Strategies When MX is Subjected to a Low Density Attack

Strategy One vs Strategy Two

	(	CEP (Feet	:)
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	EQ		
10	EQ	EQ	
20	EQ	EQ	EQ

Strategy One vs Strategy Three

		1	CEP (Feet	:)
Yield	(KT)	300	600	900
5	١	EQ		
10		EQ	EQ	
20		EQ	EQ	EQ

Strategy Two vs Strategy Three

		CEP (Feet)			
Yield	(KT)	300	600	900	
5		EQ			
10		EQ	EQ		
20		EQ	EQ	EQ	

TABLE XV

Comparison of DU Strategies When MX
is Subjected to a Medium Density Attack

Strategy One vs Strategy Two	Strategy	One	٧s	Strategy	Two
------------------------------	----------	-----	----	----------	-----

		CEP (Fe	et)
Yield (K	T) 300	600	900
5	EQ		
10	EQ	EQ	
20	EQ	EQ	EQ

## Strategy One vs Strategy Three

	C	EP (Feet	)
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	LT		
10	LT	EQ	
20	LT	LT	EQ

## Strategy Two vs Strategy Three

	CEP (Feet)			
Yield (KT)	300	600	900	
5	EQ			
10	LT	EQ		
20	LT	EQ	EQ	

TABLE XVI

Comparison of DU Strategies When MX
is Subjected to a High Density Attack

Strategy One vs Strategy Two

	C	CEP (Feet	)
Yield (KT)	300	600	900
5	EQ		
10	EQ	LT	
20	LT	GT	EQ

Strategy One vs Strategy Three

		CEP (Feet)			
Yield (KT	300	600	900		
5	EQ				
10	EQ	LT			
20	LT	EQ	EQ		

Strategy Two vs Strategy Three

	CEP (Feet)			
Yield (KT)	300	600	900	
5	EQ			
10	EQ	EQ		
20	EQ	EQ	EQ	

### TABLE XVII

## Comparison of DU Strategies by Attack

## Low Density Attack

Strategy	One	EQ	Strategy	Two
Strategy	One	EQ	Strategy	Three
Strategy	Two	EO	Strategy	Three

## Medium Density Attack

Strategy	One	EQ	Strategy	Two
Strategy	One	LT	Strategy	Three
Strategy	Two	LT	Strategy	Three

# High Density Attack

Strategy	One	??	Strategy	Two
Strategy	One	LT	Strategy	Three
Strategy	Two	EQ	Strategy	Three

is more effective in defending MX, additional runs of the model were made with the number of trials increased to 2400. This yields a 95 percent confidence interval about the true mean of plus or minus two percent. Table XVIII presents the results for the three interceptor configurations which gave conflicting indications. Table XVIII indicates Strategy One is more effective than Strategy Two in defending MX for one interceptor configuration. These results indicate that Strategy One, that of using the first two interceptors to defend either the MX or the DU while reserving the last interceptor for MX defense only, is the most effective of the DU strategies.

Comparisons of Shelter Hardness Levels. The effects of increasing shelter hardness were significant decreases in MX PK for some hardness increases and no significant decreases in MX PK for other increases. Increasing shelter hardness had no statistically significant impact on the PKs of the low density attack. When subjected to the medium density attack, MX survival was significantly improved by increasing sure-kill levels from 1000 to 1250 psi and again by hardness increases from 1250 psi to 1500 psi. A marked improvement in MX survival was achieved for the high density attack by increasing the shelter sure-kill level from 750 to 1000 psi. All other increases had no statistically significant effects on MX survivability.

TABLE XVIII

Strategy One vs Strategy Two when Subjected to a High Density Attack (2400 Trials)

Strategy One vs	Strategy Two	ΕQ	LT	БQ
PK	Strategy Two	58(1398)	39(931)	53(1267)
PK	Strategy One	56 (1347)	35(846)	52(1251)
Interceptor	CEP (Feet)	009	300	009
Interd	Yield (KT)	10	20	2.0

Comparison Between LOAD Deployment and Increased Shelter Hardness. A comparison can be made between the effectiveness of increasing the hardness of undefended shelters and deploying LOAD. Since DU Strategy One has already been shown to be the most effective, only that strategy was considered. Increasing shelter hardness does not improve MX survivability when subjected to the low density attack. Therefore, the low density attack is not included in the comparisons. The results of these comparisons against medium and high density attacks are shown in Tables XIX and XX. In Tables XIX and XX. "EO" means the given interceptor and shelter hardness produced statistically equivalent levels of MX destruction. "LT" means the interceptor resulted in a statistically significant lower MX PK than did the shelter's level of hardness. "GT" means the interceptor resulted in a statistically significant higher level of MX destruction than did the shelter hardness level. If the interceptor or hardness level produces a statistically significant lower value for MX destruction, the system is more effective in improving MX survivability. Deploying LOAD is more effective than increasing shelter hardness in improving MX survivability when an MX complex is subjected to a low density attack. Against a medium density attack, LOAD deployment is more effective. Shelter hardness is more effective only at hardness levels above 1500 psi and when compared to interceptors with CEP

TABLE XIX

DU With Strategy One vs Increased Hardness:

Medium Density Attack

In	iterceptor	Sure-Kill Levels (psi)				
Yield (	KT), CEP (Feet)	750	1000	1250	1500	1750
S	300	LT	LT	LT	EQ	EQ
10	300	LT	LT	LT	LT	EQ
10	600	LT	LT	LT	GT	GT
20	300	LT	LT	LT	LT	LT
20	600	LT	LT	LT	EQ	EQ
20	900	LT	LT	LT	GT	GT

TABLE XX

# DU With Strategy One vs Increased Hardness:

# High Density Attack

Sure-Kill Levels (psi)						
Yield	(KT), CEP (Feet)	750	1000	1250	1500	1750
5	300	LT	GT	GT	GT	GT
10	300	LT	EQ	EQ	EQ	EQ
10	600	LT	GT	GT	GT	GT
20	300	LT	LŢ	LT	LT	LT
20	600	LT	GT	GT	GT	GT
20	900	LT	GT	GT	GT	GT

(feet)/yield (KT) of 900/20 or 600/10. To combat a high density attack, shelter sure-kill levels above 1000 psi produced a higher expected level of MX survivability. This is true for all comparisons except those with interceptor CEP (feet)/yield (KT) of 300/10 or 300/20. The 300/10 interceptor is equally as effective as sure-kill hardness levels above 1000 psi, while the 300/20 interceptor is more effective than sure-kill hardness levels above 1000 psi.

If a low or medium density attack is expected, then deploying LOAD with Strategy One provides the hgihest expected MX survivability. To combat a high density attack, either shelter sure-kill levels should be 1000 psi or higher, or the interceptors should have relatively high yield and low CEP and be deployed with Strategy One.

### IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### Conclusions

Of the three strategies investigated, Strategy Cne is the most effective. Strategy Two is almost as effective as Strategy One and is slightly better than Strategy Three. However, Strategy One is much better than Strategy Three.

Increases in shelter hardness did not improve MX survivability of attacks by high yield RVs. As the yield of attacking RVs decreases and their number increases, increasing shelter hardness becomes a more effective means of improving MX survivability. This was quite evident for the attack of an MX complex by 45 RVs with yields of 125 KT and CEPs of 1400 feet.

CEP is critical in determining the effectiveness of a weapon. The values attributed to both the enemy RVs and the interceptors are very important. As RV CEP decreases, MX becomes less survivable. Lower interceptor CEPs cause dramatic improvements in interceptor PKs. A decrease of 50 feet in interceptor CEP from 300 feet to 250 feet increases an interceptor's PK by five percent.

Against low and medium density attacks, the deployment of LOAD is a more effective means of improving MX survivability than increases in shelter hardness. However, against high density, low yield attacks, increasing shelter hardness is more

effective than LOAD deployment unless LOAD has low CEP, high yield interceptors. Even then, hardness improvement could be more attractive if the release of nuclear radiation in the atmosphere by a LOAD interceptor is an untenable option.

#### Recommendations

The revived importance of and interest in BMD makes future efforts in this area important. A classified approach could prove most useful as model inputs could be made more realistic.

Several areas of the model could be enhanced. The RV-interceptor engagement could be treated more realistically and the treatment of the nuclear effects could be made more rigorous and precise. Other possible interceptor strategies might be included in the model. For example, two interceptors might be launched against a single attacking RV. The possibilities of deploying more than one DU or MX per complex could be investigated, as could the possibility of building more MX shelters. As the LOAD system is developed and refined, the scope and needs for future research will be increased.

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APPENDICES

#### APPENDIX A

### Probability of Kill Due to Cratering

A nuclear contact surface burst creates a crater. Any object within the apparent radius  $(R_a)$  of the crater will be destroyed. To calculate the apparent radius of the crater, the following equation is used:

$$R_a = R_s (Y^{.3})$$

where Y is the yield of the weapon in KT and  $R_{\rm S}$  is the apparent radius of a crater created by a one KT weapon. For a contact surface burst in dry soil,  $R_{\rm S}$  is 61 feet (Ref 11:254-255). The probability of kill (PK) of cratering is defined by the circular normal function and can be found using the following equation:

$$P_{K} = \int_{-R_{a}}^{R_{a}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sigma} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\frac{Y}{\sigma})^{2}} dy$$

where

$$\sigma = CEP/\sqrt{2 \ln 2}$$

Letting  $z = Y/\sigma \rightarrow dy = \sigma dz$  and substituting in the above equation gives

$$PK = \int_{-R_{a/\sigma}}^{R_{a/\sigma}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi \sigma}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^2} dz$$

This implies:

$$PK = \int_{-R_{a/\sigma}}^{R_{a/\sigma}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} dz$$

$$= 2 \int_{0}^{R_{a/\sigma}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} dz$$

$$= 2 \left[ \Phi \left( \frac{R_{a/\sigma} - .5}{2} \right) \right]$$

where  $\Phi$  represents the cumulative normal distribution (Ref 3). The approximate value of  $\Phi(x)$  is found using the following equation:

$$(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} dz$$

$$= 1 - \left[1/\left(2\left[1 + .196854x + .115194x^{2} + .000344x^{3} + .019527x^{4}\right]^{4}\right)\right]$$

where  $x \ge 0$  (Ref 1:932).

#### APPENDIX B

### PROBABILITY OF KILL ROUTINE

To calculate the probability of kill (PK) of the shelters due to overpressure, a routine known as the ten cell model is used. The ten cell model requires the suresafe and sure-kill ranges of the shelter. The sure-safe range is the range at which survival is expected 98 percent of the time, and sure-kill range is the range at which destruction is expected 98 percent of the time. In the model, these ranges must be calculated using the sure-safe and sure-kill overpressure levels of the shelters. In computing the PK of an interceptor against an RV, the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges were calculated separately and entered in the model as data.

The overpressure created by a contact surface burst is similar to that of a "free-air" burst with twice the yield. The graph of peak overpressure (psi) vs distance from burst in feet for a "free-air" burst of a one KT device is presented in Figure 3 (Ref 11:91, 109). Reading from the graph yields the following set of points:

(feet, psi)

(100, 2000)

(135, 1000)

(175, 500)

(225, 200)

(300, 100)

(400, 50)

(600, 20)

(800, 10)

An equation representing this graph is required. To find an approximation of this graph, the following steps were taken:

- 1.  $\ln 850 \approx 6.75$
- 2. Postulate that equation is of form

$$x(distance) = e^{(6.75)/(psi/10)^{2}}$$

and solve for z.

3. Find z when x = 100 feet and psi = 2000

$$100 = e^{6.75/(2000/10)^2}$$

$$ln(100) = 6.75 / (200)^{2}$$

$$(200)^2 = 6.75 / (4.61)$$

$$(200)^z = 1.47$$

$$z \ln(200) = \ln 1.47$$




Figure 3. Peak Overpressure from a 1-Kiloton Free Air Burst for Sea-Level Ambient Conditions (Ref 11:109)

4. Therefore

$$x = e^{6.75/(psi/10)^{.072}}$$
so
$$x = e^{7.967/(psi)^{.072}}$$

5. Check the difference between the values read from the graph and the values provided by the equation.

TABLE XXI

Graph vs Equation

PSI	x(graph)	x(equation)	difference	
2000	100	100	O	
1000	135	127	8	
500	175	162	13	
200	225	230	5	
100	300	304	4	
50	400	408	8	
20	600	614	14	
. 10	850	854	4	

The equation provides an approximation which is within 7.5 percent of the graph.

The equation developed above provides the scaled range for a one KT weapon. The range (R) is found using the following equation:

$$R = R_s (Y^{1/3})$$

where  $R_S$  is the scaled range for a one KT weapon and Y is the weapon yield (Ref 11:108). Thus, the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges may be found using the following equation:

$$R = \exp(7.967/(psi)^{.072})(2 \text{ RV KT})^{1/3}$$

where psi is the sure-safe or sure-kill psi levels of the shelters and RV KT is the yield in KT of the attacking RVs.

The ten cell model is a procedure for calculating the PK of a given weapon against a designated target. The model requires the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges of the target, the CEP of the weapon, and the distance of the target from designated ground zero (DGZ). DGZ is the point at which the weapon is aimed. The ten cell model places 10 cells of equal probability of hit (PH) around the DGZ. That is, the weapon has an equal probability of impacting in each cell. Figure 4 shows these cells.




Figure 4. Ten Cells of Equal PH

Thus, the weapon would have a ten percent chance of impacting in each cell. It should be noted that distance from DGZ is infinity for the outermost circle of the model. The case where a target is a given distance from the DGZ and a weapon impacts at some third point is depicted in Figure 5. The PK of a target at a distance x from DGZ is a function of the PH at a point described by  $\rho$  and  $\varphi$  and the probability of damage (PD) of the target at a distance r from the point of impact. Thus, the following equation describes the situation:

$$PK(x) = \int_{0}^{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} PH(\rho,\phi) PD(r) r dr d\phi .$$




Figure 5. Weapon Impact

Placing the ten cell model over Figure 5 and treating each cell as a discrete impact point produces the following equation:

$$PK(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{N_T} PH(\rho_i, \phi_i) \triangle A_i PD(r_i)$$

where the variables are defined as follows:

 $\phi_i$  = angle of cell in relation to DGZ;

 $\Delta A_i$  = area of cell i;

 $N_T$  = number of cells in model.

Other variables of the model are:

 $<\rho_i>$  = distance from DGZ to probabilistic center of cell i ;

 $\eta_i$  = number of cells in ring i;

N<sub>i</sub> = number of cells in ring i plus all cells
 inside this ring.

The following figure will illustrate the above variables. For the ten cell model, the following values can be assigned:

$$N_{T} = 10$$
  $N_{1} = 1$   $N_{2} = 5$   $N_{3} = 10$   $n_{1} = 1$   $n_{2} = 4$   $n_{3} = 5$   $n_{3} = \infty$ .

Recalling the equation for PK,

$$PK(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{N_T} PH(\rho_i, \phi_i) \triangle A_i PD (r_i) ,$$

 $PH(\rho_i,\phi_i)$   $\Delta$   $A_i = \frac{1}{N_T}$  for each i since the model is constructed so that an attacking weapon has an equal probability of hitting within each cell. Thus




Figure 6. Ten Cell Model on a Target

$$PK(x) = \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i=1}^{N_T} PD(r_i) . From the law of cosines,$$

$$r_i^2 = x^2 + \langle r_i \rangle^2 - 2x \langle \rho_i \rangle \cos \langle \phi_i \rangle \qquad (1)$$

To solve for  $<\rho_1>$  ,  $\rho_1$  must be found. Since each cell of model represents an equal probability of hit and since

the probability of hit is distributed according to the circular lognormal function, the following equation can be used:

$$\int_{0}^{\rho_{i}} \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\rho/\sigma)^{2}} 2\pi \rho d\rho = \frac{N_{i}}{N_{T}}$$
 (2)

Equation (2) can be solved for  $\rho_i$  . Letting  $z = \rho/\sigma$  and substituting yields:

$$\int_{0}^{\rho_{i/\sigma}} \frac{1}{2\rho\sigma^{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} 2\pi z \sigma \sigma dz = \frac{N_{i}}{N_{T}}.$$

This reduces to

$$- \int_{0}^{\rho_{i/\sigma}} (-z) e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} dz = \frac{N_{i}}{N_{T}} .$$

Integrating over the limits of integration yields:

$$1 - e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\rho_{\hat{1}}/\sigma)^2} = \frac{N_{\hat{1}}}{N_{\hat{T}}}$$

which implies

$$-\frac{1}{2} (\rho_{i}/\sigma)^{2} = \ln (1 - \frac{N_{i}}{N_{T}})$$
.

It can be shown that  $\sigma^2 = CEP^2/(2 \ln 2)$  so

$$\rho_{i}/CEP = \frac{-\ln (1 - N_{i}/N_{T})}{\ln 2}$$
 (3)

Now  $\langle \rho_i \rangle$  can be found.

$$\langle \rho_{i} \rangle = \frac{\int_{\rho_{i-1}}^{\rho_{i}} \rho \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\rho/\sigma)^{2}} 2\pi\rho d\rho}{\int_{\rho_{i-1}}^{\rho_{i}} \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\rho/\sigma)^{2}} 2\pi\rho d\rho}$$

The numerator equals  $\frac{N_{\perp}}{N_{\mathrm{T}}}$  , so

$$\langle \rho_i \rangle = N_T / N_i \int_{\rho_{i-1}}^{\rho_i} \rho \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^2} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\rho/\sigma)^2} 2\pi\rho d\rho$$
.

Letting  $z=\rho/\sigma$  implies  $dz=\frac{d\rho}{\sigma}$  and when  $\rho=\rho_{\hat{1}}$  ,  $z=\rho_{\hat{1}}/\sigma$  .

$$\langle \rho_{i} \rangle = N_{T}/N_{i} \int_{\rho_{i-1}/\sigma}^{\rho_{i}/\sigma} z\sigma \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} 2\pi z\sigma \sigma dz$$

$$\langle \rho_i \rangle = N_T/N_i \sigma \int_{\rho_{i-1}/\sigma}^{\rho_{i}/\sigma} z e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^2} z dz$$
.

Letting u = z and  $dv = e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^2} zdz$  and integrating by parts gives

$$\langle \rho_{i} \rangle = \frac{N_{T}^{\sigma}}{N_{i}} \{ [z e^{-l_{2}z^{2}}] - \int_{\rho_{i-1/\sigma}}^{\rho_{i/\sigma}} e^{-l_{2}z^{2}} dz \}$$

$$\langle \rho_{i} \rangle = \frac{N_{T}^{\sigma}}{N_{i}} \{ [z e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}}]^{\rho_{i}/\sigma}_{\rho_{i-1}/\sigma} - \sqrt{2\pi} [\int_{-\infty}^{\rho_{i}/\sigma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} ]^{\rho_{i}/\sigma}_{\rho_{i-1}/\sigma} + \int_{-\infty}^{\rho_{i-1}/\sigma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}} dz ] \}$$

Therefore,

$$\langle \rho_{i} \rangle = \frac{N_{T}^{\sigma}}{N_{i}} \{ [z e^{-\frac{1}{2}z^{2}}]^{\rho_{i}/\sigma} - \sqrt{2\pi} [\Phi(\rho_{i}/\sigma)]^{\rho_{i}-1/\sigma} - \Phi(\rho_{i-1}/\sigma) \}$$

where  $\Phi$  represents the cumulative normal distribution.

Substituting for 
$$\sigma$$
 where  $\sigma = \frac{CEP}{\sqrt{2 \ln^2}}$  gives

$$\langle \rho_i \rangle = \frac{N_T}{N_i} \frac{CEP}{\sqrt{2 \ln^2}} \left\{ \frac{\rho_i \sqrt{2 \ln^2}}{CEP} e^{-\ln^2(\rho_i/CEP)^2} \right\}$$

$$-\frac{\sqrt{2 \ln^2}}{CEP} e^{-\ln^2(\rho_{i-1}/CEP)}$$

$$-\sqrt{2\pi} \left[ \phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{2 \ln^2}}{CEP} \rho_i \right) - \phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{2 \ln^2}}{CEP} \rho_{i-1} \right) \right] \right\}$$

Simplifying,

$$\frac{\langle \rho_{\hat{i}} \rangle}{CEP} = -\frac{N_T}{N_{\hat{i}}} \left\{ \frac{\rho_{\hat{i}}}{CEP} e^{-\ln^2 \left(\frac{\rho_{\hat{i}}}{CEP}\right)^2} - \frac{\rho_{\hat{i}-1}}{CEP} e^{-\ln^2 \left(\frac{\rho_{\hat{i}}}{CEP}\right)^2} \right\}$$

$$-\frac{\sqrt{2\pi}}{\sqrt{2\ln^2}} \left[ \phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{2\ln^2}}{\text{CEP}} \rho_i \right) - \phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{2\ln^2}}{\text{CEP}} \rho_{i-1} \right) \right] \right\}$$
 (4)

To find  $\langle \phi_i \rangle$ , the number of cells in a ring must be divided into 360°. This will provide an equal area in each cell of a particular ring. The following values for the variables of the ten cell model can be found (Table XXII).

Recalling Eq (1),

$$r_i^2 = x^2 + \langle \rho_i \rangle^2 - 2x \langle \rho_i \rangle \cos \langle \phi_i \rangle$$
, (1)

it can be seen that the data presented in Table XXI is not usable in Eq (1). However, by dividing both sides of the equation by  $(CEP)^2$ , the equation can be written as follows:

TABLE XXII

Ten	Cell	Mode1	Values

Ring Nr. i	Cell	Cells in Ring i	Cells Inside N <sub>i</sub>	ρ <sub>i</sub> /CEP	CEP	< <sup>6</sup> i <sup>&gt;</sup>
1	1	1	1	.39	0	N/A
2	2	4	5	1.00	.711	45°
2	3	4	5	1.00	.711	135°
2	4	4	5	1.00	.711	225°
2	5	4	S	1.00	.711	315°
3	6	5	10	∞	1.51	36°
3	7	5	10	œ	1.51	108°
3	8	5	10	<b>6</b> 0	1.51	180°
	9	5	10	œ	1.51	252°
3 3	10	\$	10	<b>∞</b>		324°
						_

$$\left(\frac{r_{i}}{CEP}\right)^{2} = \left(\frac{\chi}{CEP}\right)^{2} + \left(\frac{\langle \rho_{i} \rangle}{CEP}\right)^{2} - \frac{2 \times \langle \rho_{i} \rangle \cos \langle \phi_{i} \rangle}{CEP^{2}}$$
 (5)

Simplifying,

$$r_i = CEP\left(\sqrt{\left(\frac{X}{CEP}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{\langle \rho_i \rangle}{CEP}\right)^2 - \frac{2 \times \langle \rho_i \rangle \cos \langle \phi_i \rangle}{CEP^2}}\right)$$

 ${f r}_{f i}$  can be calculated using data from Table XXI (Ref 2). It was previously shown that

$$PK(x) = \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i=1}^{N_T} PD(r_i).$$

To find PK(x),  $PD(r_i)$  must be determined. The probability of damage function can be expressed as the complementary cumulative lognormal distribution

$$PD(r) = 1 - \int_{0}^{r} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\alpha} \ \beta r} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\frac{\ln r^{2} - \alpha}{\beta})} dr$$

(Ref 5:5). Using this relationship,

$$PD(r_i) = \int_0^{r_i} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \beta} r' e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\frac{2n\theta' - \alpha}{\beta})} dr'$$

Letting  $z' = \frac{\ln r' - \alpha}{\beta}$  and  $dz' = \frac{1}{r'\beta} dr'$  give

$$PD(r_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{z_i} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-l_2(z')^2} dz'$$
.

$$PD(\dot{r_i} = \Phi(z_i) \text{ where } z_i = \frac{\ln r_i - \alpha}{\beta}$$
.

It has been shown that  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are constants and can be found using the following equations.

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{2} \ln [(RSS)(RSK)]$$

$$\beta = \frac{1}{2^2 sK} \quad \text{ln (RSS/RSK)}$$

where RSS is the sure-safe range and RSK is the sure-kill range.  $z_{SK} = 2.054$  when the sure-kill range is set at probability of kill level of 98 percent (Ref 5:7-8).

The values of PK(x) can be computed. The required inputs are the yield and CEP of the attacking weapon, the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges, and the distance of the target from DGZ. Given these inputs, the ten cell model can determine the probability of kill of a weapon against a target.

#### APPENDIX C

# Sure-Safe and Sure-Kill Ranges of RV When Subjected to Neutron Fluence

Sure-safe and sure-kill neutron fluence levels of the attacking RV are required to calculate the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges of the RVs. Neutron fluences of  $10^{13}$  and  $10^{17}$  neutrons per square centimeter (n/cm²) were chosen as the sure-safe and sure-kill fluence levels of the RVs. The actual fluences depend on the characteristics of the RV.

To compute the desired ranges, the number of neutrons produced per kiloton yield of the interceptors must be known. The neutron source can be properly defined only by considering the actual design of the specific weapon (Ref 11: 363). Since a thermonuclear device produces the greatest number of neutrons per kiloton, the interceptor warhead will be assumed to be thermonuclear. In general, the neutrons per KT yield of a thermonuclear device is approximately 3.16 x 10<sup>23</sup> neutrons per kiloton (Ref 2).

Figure 7 shows the  $4\pi R^2$  neutron fluence as a function of the mass integral where R is the slant range from burst point to target. The mass integral (MI) measures the amount of matter a neutron must pass through to reach its target. An equation which fits this graph is:




Figure 7.  $4\pi R^2$  Neutron Fluence For Fission and Thermonuclear Sources (Ref 9:55)

$$\ln (4\pi R^2 \text{ Dose}) = -6.775 + .5269 \times 10^{-2} (\text{MI})$$

$$- .54364 \times 10^{-5} (\text{MI})^2 - .21468 \times 10^{-3} (\text{MI})^{3/2}$$

$$-3.8214 (\text{MI})^{1/2} + 10.875 (\text{MI})^{1/3}$$

$$- 1.3975 (\ln (\text{MI})) .$$

$$(\text{Ref 9:51-55})$$

A homogeneous atmosphere with a density of 0.001 gram per cubic centimeter was assumed. This assumption is reasonable for the altitude of the intercept. This quantity is used to calculate the MI and

 $MI = R \rho$ 

where R is the distance between the target and the burst point, and  $\rho$  is the density of the atmosphere.

With the above information, the following interactive program is an iterative process used to calculate the sure-safe and sure-kill ranges.

FRANT'THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM IS AN ACTU 把 POSIGIAN. PAINT MUST ENTER THE DISTANCE IN COLUMN NURSE POINT AU PRINT'FOR THE GIVEN ATTACK. THE PROGRAM COMPUTES THE NEUTRON PRINT'FLUENCE THE TARGET EXPERIENCES. WHO THE FLUENCE IS PRINT'EQUAL TO THE DESIRED LEVEL, THE DULL ROW HAS THE DESIRED PRINT SURE-KILL OR SURE-SAFE RANGE. PRINT'ENTER THE SLANT IN FEFT FROM BURST POINT TO TARGET' INPUT SR SR=SRX33.48 PRINT'ENTER THE YIELD IN KILOTONS OF THE INTERCEPTOR' IMPUT KT M1=.001\*SR U=-6.775+.5269E-2\*MI-.54364E-5\*MI\*MI-.21468E-3\*(MIC1.5) K=J-3.8214\*(MIE.5)+10.875\*(MIE(1/3))-1.3975\*LOG(MI) DOSE=8xP(K)\*0.16E+20xXT/(4,\*0.1416x(GRT2)) PRINT\*THE SLANT RANGE=\*\*\*SK/30.48 PRINT"THE YILLD OF THE INTERCEPTOR=\*\*KT PHINT\*THE DOSE ON RU AT GIVEN SLANT RANGE \* PRINT'FOR THE GIVEN YIELD = 1,008E 

# APPENDIX D

A Listing of the Computer Model

and

The Q-GERT Network

### Q-GERT MODEL

```
*** INPUT CARDS ***
GEN, HD ORE, MUDEL 2, 11, 21, 1977, 5, 8, 1, , 100, , , 84
SOU, 1, , , 1, A, M"
*NODE 1 DREFTES ATTACKING RVS AND
*TARGETS HACH ON A SHELFER
VAS, 1, 1,UF, 1, 2, 1N, 1, 3, 1N, 7, , 4, UF, 2, 5, UF, 3+
ACT, 1, 1, , , 1/ARR1/A_, (9) A2._[.\1.
ACT, 1, 2, (2) 42 . L 2, 45 f
ACT,1,9 ,30,1,(3)42.GT.47
SOU-7, 1,1,4,85
THE GRAIL CIPT ENDISER VANCOURS 7 FEDOM
MMX TO A SHELTER
VAS,7,2,JF,4,3,UF,5,4,JF,2,5,JF,3,6,UF,54
ACT,7,5,(8)42.LE.45*
ACT,7,9,(E)#3.Lz.45*
ACT,7,1 ,(9)A2.Gf.45*
ACT,7,11,(9)43.55.45*
REG, 2, 1,1'
ACT, 2, 5-
ACT, 2, 6*
QUE,5/MXGJE,(10)12+
QUE, 6/DUGJE, (11)13:
QUE, 8/MXSHEL, (1 ) 12'
QUE, 3/ DUSHEL, (1 ) 13'
REG, 10, 1, 1
VAS,13,2,00,15
REG, 11, 1, 1, 1, 1
VAS, 11, 3, 30, "
MAT, 12, 2, 11-, 81
MAT,13,3,5/15,5"
REG, 14, 1, 1+
VAS,14,2,10,11
REG, 15, 1, 1*
VAS, 15, 3, 30, 14
ACT, 10, 11
ACT, 11, 17
ACT, 1+,15
ACT, 15, 17'
REG, 15, 1, 1 *
```

```
*NODE 16 CALCULATES TOTAL NUMBER
 *OF RVS AIMED AT THE MK SHELFER
 VAS, 15, 7, JF, 71
REG, 17, 1, 1*
*NODE 17 DALCULATES TOTAL MUMBER
FOF RVS AIMED AT THE DU SHELTER
VAS, 17, 8, JF, 8*
ACT, 15, 12, CC, 1*
ACT,17,2 ,C0,1*
REG, 13, 1, 1, 4,
ACT, 13, 19, (5) A2. . F. 47.
ACT, 19,8 , (5) A7, EQ. . *
ACT, 13, 21, UN, 1, (3) 47, GT. 6:
VAS,19,2,18,1,4,30,1*
REG, 23, 1, 1, 1, 1-
VAS, 21, 3, 1 N, 1, 4, 13, 2*
ACT, 23, 21, (9) 43._7.48*
ACT, 2., 81, (6) A8, E3. >
ACT, 2., 21, UN, 1, (3) 48, 57. 9
SIN, 37/MXXLIVE, 1, 1, 0, 1.
STA, 31/DGALIVE, 1,1,0,1
STA, 33 /RVC OUNT, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1
REG, 21, 1, 1*
*NODE 21 ISIGNS EACH BY ATHED AT THE
*DU OR MX SHELTER A RAYDOM MJ13ER
VAS, 21, 5, JF, 9*
ACT, 21, 22
QUE, 22/EV#RRIVE, 3, , D, B/5*
#Q-NODE 22 DETERMINES SEQUENCE
*OF ATTACK FOR THE RVS
ACT, 22, 23, 00, 50*
REG, 23, 1, 1, A*
ACT, 23, 21, (9) A4. E3. 1*
ACT, 23, 21, (5) 44. E3. 2=
REG, 24, 1, 1, 5=
FROME 24 LAUNCHES AN ENTERCHENCE,
*IF AVAILABLE, IT AN AV ATTACKING
*THE MX SHELTER
VAS, 24, 2, JF, 1 , 3, JF, 11'
ACT, 2+, 20, (1) 2+
ACT, 24, 3 , (1) 34
REG, 25, 1, 1, 54
```

[mg] and height and the stringers and an improper and a second of the

```
MNODE 25 LAUNCHES AN INTERCEPTOR,
*IF AVAILABLE, AT AN RV ATTACKING
*THE DU SHELTER
VAS, 25, 2, JF, 1., 3, JF, 11'
ACT, 25,92, (E) 2*
ACT, 25, 20, (6) 3*
REG. 25 . 1 . 1 . F*
VAS, 26, 2, JF, 12, 3, JF, 13'
ACT, 25, 27, (6) 2*
AGT, 25, 28, (8) 3*
STA, 27 / DUJ E&D, 1, 1, 3, 1
*STATISTICS NODE 27 RELEASED
*IF OU IS DESTROYED
STA,23/DU0LIVE,_,1,0,1
*STATISTICS NODE 28 FELEASED
*IF OU IS NOT DESTROYED
STA, 32 / DUILIVE, 1, 1, D, I'
REG, 23, 1, 1*
ACT, 23, 31
REG, 33, 1, 1*
ACT, 31, 31
REG, 31, 1, 1, 4*
*NODE 31 DETERMINES NUMBER OF
*RVS REACHING MX SHELTER
VAS, 31,4, JF, 12, 5, JF, 141
ACT, 31, 33, (9) A5. E3. 14
ACT, 31, 32, (5) AE. E3. 21
STA, 32/RVCOUNT, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1
REG, 33, 1, 1, P*
VAS, 33,5, JF, 15, 5, JF, 16
ACT, 33,7., (c) 5*
ACT, 33,71, (8)5*
SIN,73/MX3E40,1,1,3,1*
#SINK NODE 71 RELEASED IF THE
*MX IS DESTROYED
SIN, 71/MXALIVE, i, i, j, j, I*
*SINK NOD: /1 RL.ERSED IF THE
*MX SURVIVES THE ATTACK
PAR, 1, , 1, 1, 1, 1
FIN+
```

#### USER FUNCTIONS

```
CARD AG NCICKLE
      DOMMONARYNOE, NETBU(100), NREL (100), NRELP (100), NRELP (100),
     ACPT, EBET, (4, .) MARAM (1. .) OTA, EPUSP, NUSPA
      23443N/R4NS/SSR(136), SKR(1.1), STR
      COMMON/VARIARVKT, GSPSI, SKPSI, DEFIN, INKT, RSS, HSK
      DD4404/V4R2/GEPRV.GEPIN.PD.4TTRV.DEP.X.DJIN
      30 f) (1,2,3,,,5,5,7,8,9,1.,11,12,13,1,,1,,16), IFA
      THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS RETURN VALUES TO ATTRIBUTES
          OF THE G-GERT MODEL
      153[34 NUMPER OF ATTACKING RUSCATTE)
      コミニオミエミム
1
      PSET384
      DEFERMINE MINIMUN NUMBER OF RVS ATTACKING EACH
        SHELFER (ATTA)
2
      J==[4T(ATTRV/23_)
      VSLIES
      DETERMINE NUMBER OF RVS RANDOMLY AIMED AT
        SHELFERS(ATT)
3
      JF=$17RV-INT(ATT# V/23.) *23.
      VSL7EF
341+
      RANDIMLY ASSIGN MX TO A SHELTER (ATT2)
0
4
      34=384 ND(1)
      J==[47(RN*23)+1.
      VSETES
3
      RANDIMLY ASSIGN DU TO A SHELTER (ATT3)
      (S) GNAFC=FF
3
      J==[4T(RN*23)+24
      RELIER
      DEFERMINE NUMBER OF RVS RANDOMLY AIMED
        AT SHELTERS (ATTS)
      J==1FFRV-INT(A T-V/23.) *23.+23.
5
      VSETIES
      DEFERMINE NUMBER OF AVS ATTACKING MX (ATT7)
7
      4882=34138(2)
      ATT+=341RB(1)
      J==1172+471:
      A SELIS 4
```

```
DEFERMINE NUMBER OF RVS ATTACKING DUCATTED
      ATT3=34TRB(3)
      AFF+= SATRB(L)
      UF=4553+6TIL
      VSLIES
CARANDOMEY ASSIGN A NUMBER BETAGEN ONE AND ONE
      (6TTA)VS HOA3 CT OFFICET
3
      24=3244D(3)
      JF=INT(RN*11:(.)+1.
      V SETES
      DEFERMINE PROPABILITY OF DESTROYING ATTACKING PV
        ATTH AN INTERCEPTOR (ATTZ)
      DHECK TO DETERMINE IF DU HAS BEEN DESTROYED
1.
      IF(NF3(27).GT...)GO TO 123
      DEFERMINE IF REMAINING INTERCEPTORS WILL DIFFEND DU
      111+=31T4B(+)
      IF(ATTA.EQ.2 .AND. DEFIN.LE.STR)30 TO 10.
      DEFERMINE AVAILIABILITY OF INTERCEPTORS
      IF(DIFIN.ED. J) SO TO 140
      DEFERMINE SURE SAFE AND SURE KILL RANGES OF INTERCEPTOR
      RRS IS SURE SAFE RANGE AND RSK IS SURE KILL HANGE
      352 IND 55K ARE THE ARRAYS FOR THESE RANGES AND
         THE RANGES DEPEND ON INTERCEPTOR YIELD
      RSS=SSR(INKT)
      RSC=3 (R (INCT)
      FIRE INTERCEPTOR
      DEFINEDEFINE1.
      DEPEDEPIN
      X = 1.
      JSES FEN CALL MODEL TO CALCULATE PK
      34__ JS(1)
      ]==>)
      REFURN
150
      JF = ].
      REFIEL
3416
      DEFERMINE PROBLEMINT OF INTERDEPTOR MISSING RY(ATTE)
11
      1172=38T4B(2)
      J==11-1112
      RETURN
```

```
DAIDULATE PROSESTLITY OF ONE RV DESIKOVING A SHELTER
      DALBJEATE THE PK DUE TO OVERPRESSIVE
         RES AND RSK ARE SURE SAFE AND SIRE KILL RANGES
12
      ?$<=E<P() .967/($KPSI+*,.72)) \ (?4<[\2) ++ (1./3.)
      333=[x2(7.957/(SSPSI++.172))/(3/([12)++(1./3.)
      <= ',
      DEPEDEPRY
      34__ JS(1)
      ><)>:>)
     CALDULATE PK FROM CRATERING
      3243=51.1(2VKT +.3)
      313=359/50-1(2:AL36(2.))
      774:304D/SIG
      ?<><?<?: 21 (1.-(1./(2.*(1+.13585)))724+,115134*78 A- 2+
     5. J - 34-47-KA1 + 5+ . . 19327 + 7.28*+ - ) + 4.11 - .5)
      CALCULATE PROSESTLITY OF KILL FROM ONE RV
      24=2402+(1+EK0E) - 2K0A
      J==>(
      SEL15A
      CAUDILATE PROBABILITY OF SHELTER SURVIVING ONE RV
13
      $FF2=34TR9(2)
      J==L.-1772
      FSUTE
      ACCOUNT FOR RVS AIRED AT MX(ATT5)
      14=4F2(29)+NTC(3:)
1 4
      ATT7=54TRB(7)
      TF(A).EQ.A)T7)JF=1
      I=(41.NE.ATT?)UF=2
      V51737
      CALCULATE PROBABILITY OF MX DESTRUCTION(ATTE)
15
      111+= 31TRB(L)
       JF=1.-(1.+4TT%) +*NTC (30)
      V SET JES
0+4#
      CALCULATE PROBABILITY OF HX SURVIVAL (ATTS)
      17)65T4E:5114
      J==1-11T5
       FETTRY
       E40
```

#### USER INPUT

```
SUBSTUTINE U.
      DOMADNIOVARINDE, NETRU (1.3), NREL (1.3), NRELP (1:3), NREL2(1:4),
     BURJU, MRUNS, NTD (1 1), PARAM(11, , -), 1316, TNDW
      JOYHON/RANG/SSF (1 )(), SKR (1 )), STR
      DD44DN/VARI/RVKT, SSPSI, SKPSI, DEFIN, INKT, PSE, RSK
      DD 44D 4 / VEREZ CEPRV, CEPIN, PO, ATTRV, DEP, X, DUIT
      IHES SUBROUTINE ALLOWS THE USER TO INPUT PARAMETERS
2440
      ENFER RV YIELD
      3741:135
3486
      ENTER RV CEP
      3522/=1117
2000
      ENTER NUMBER OF ATTACKING RVS
      71151= +2
2486
      ENTER SHELTER SUNE SAFE PST
      35250=251
0444
      ENTER SHALTER SURE KILL PSI
      54251=75
      ENTER THE STHATEGY FOR THE INTERDEPTORS
      THE STRATEGY IS A MIMBER (1,2 OR 3) AND REPRESENTS
      THE NUMBER OF INTERDEPTORS THAT WILL RE USED FOR
      44 SHELTER DEFENSE ONLY.
      512=L
2100
      ENTER INTERCEPTOR YIELD
      T. N < F = 5
3446
      ENTER NUMBER OF DEFENSIVE INTERDEPTORS
      DEFINES
      JULY=3
      ENTER INTERCEPTOR CEP
      3E9[4=3i]
     ENTER THE ARRAYS FOR SURE SAFE AND SURE KILL
       RANGES OF THE RVS
      7474 SSK/1 . . . . /
      DATA SKR/1.....
      DATA(SKK(1), I=1, 23)/17.6, 25.3, 32.5, 33.1, 44.8,
     $5 1.3, 55.5, 61.65, 62.63, 73.6, 74.5, 73.1, 33.1, 37.6,
     571.3,35.0,1: ..,1: 4.,1,5.,111.,115.,119.,123.,
     $125.,131.,134.,137.,141.,144.,143.,151.,154.,
     $1,53.,151.,164.,168.,171.,174.,177.,186.,183.,
     3135,,186,,192,,195,,198,,2.1,,2.+,,2.7,,21 ./
      JATA(SKF(I),I=>3,1_0,5)/224.,277.,258.,253.,277.,
     1237.,239.,31 .,321.,331./
      7474 (SSF(I), I=1, 5 )/213.., 2499., 2723., 2035., 3 13., 3119.,
     $3213.,3226.,33 3.,3,18.,347.,,3925.,327.,,4519.,
     83356,,77...,3737.,3771.,38.4.,3836.,38465.,7250.,
     27321,,39.0,,39/3,,3997,,22,,- 13,,+ 02,,1 50,,
     31115.94125.98185.94134.94132.9+193.9+215.9 237.9
     2-2-3-,-25-,-25-,-34236.,-311.,-325.,-333., 313.,
     35357.,435...,4253.,444...6./
      74 (35 K(I) , I= 3, 16, 35) / ,45 ., 4, 222, , +573, , 62. , , 55' .,
     3-7:5-,-7 --,-781-,4316-,46:3-/
      351334
      CVE
```

#### TENCELL MODEL

```
SUBSCUTINE US(IFN)
      DIMENSION PI(1 ), THATA(10), R.(11 4(1.), 74(1 ), PD7(1 ), PD7(1)
      3344)4/QVAR/NOt,NFT3U(1;),NREL((1)),NRELF(1, ),NREL2(1, ),
     BURIN, MRUNS, NTC (1 '), PARAM (1, ., ..), TBEG, TNOW
      2)44)4/RANG/SSR(1.1),SKR(111),STR
      JOHADMINAKI/RUKT, GSPSI, SKPSI, DEFLA, INKT, RSS, FSK
      DOMMON/VARE/OLPRY, CEPIN, PD, ATTRY, DEP, X, DUIN
      DALDJUATES FK USING TEN GELL MODEL
        FOR EXPLANATION OF TEN CELL
        MODEL SEE APPENDIX B
      30 F) (1), IFN
1
      75<=2. 5.4
      1_341=.5/4_GG(+SS4k5K)
      RETA=1.7(2.475K) (ALOG(KSS/RGK))
      DATA(PI(I),I=1,1))/J.,4+.711,5*1.51/
      DATA( THETA(U), J=1,1J) /. .,45.,135.,235.,318.,38.,116.,
     3133,, 252, , 32-./
      70 3 I=1.11
      ?[([)=$0\T(P1(1):*2+(X/CEP):"2-2:X:PI(I)/CEP*
     30050(THETA(I)))+0EP
      CONFINE
3 L
      33 + <=1.1€</p>
      TRICKER (K) . ED. . AND. X.EQ. ..)30 FD 35
      *(<) = (ALSG(F1(K)) -ALPHA) /BSTA
      30 ft + (
3 F
      7(()=-16 %
      314114CC
4 .
      3)X= .
      DD 7 _=1,10
      74(_) = 485(7(L))
      >37(.) =1./(2*(1.+.196854*Z4(L)+.115134*Z4(L)**2+
     3, 33134, *ZA(L) ** 3+, 619527 *Z4(L) * f + } * * + }
      IF(7(_).ST.:.)30 TO 50
      232(_) = 1. -PDZ(L)
      30 FD 50
      2) ROZ(L)
3 (
      234=234+20R(L)
5(
      3UNIINCC
76
      ?)=?)X/1..
      RELISA
      E 4 3
```

#### USER OUTPUT

```
SURRIUGINE UG
DOMMONAR/NOTE, NETBU(100), NREL(100), NRELP(100), NRELP(100),
*CHT, EBET, (4, ,1) MARAM (1, ) OTM, SMUSP *
DOMMONANG/SSF(1)L),SKR(1LL),STR
33443N/V1{1/kVKT, 35P51,5KPS1,DEF1N,INKT, {55,FSK
COMMON/VARZ/CEPRV, CEPIN, PD, ATTRV, CEP, X, CUIN
 CABC, EVILANATIBED NO CHECC
 THES SUBROUTINE PROVIDES A PRINCOUR OF MODEL
    PARAMETERS AND PERCENT OF MX DESTROYED
    AND MK SURVIVING
DEAD=DEAD+NTO(72)
 LITYE=$LIVE+NTO(71)+NTO(66)
[F(NEUN.L3.KRUNS)GO TO 2.L
NSETES.
1_[JE=1LIVE/6.
 DEAD=DEAD/E.
PRINTS, "THE NUMBER OF ATTACKING KVS IS
                                          ",ATTRV
 PRINTS, "THE YIELD OF THE RVS IS
                                          *,FVKT
PRENTY, "THE DEP OF THE KVS IS
                                           CEFRY
 PRINT', "THE INTERCEPTOR STRATESY IS
                                           .STF
PRINT " HE NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS IS
                                          .DUIN
PRINTS, "THE YILLD OF THE INTERDEPTOR IS
                                          ",INKT
PRINE", "THE CEP OF THE INTERCEPTOR IS
                                          ".CEPIN
                                          ",SSFSI
 PRINCE, "THE SURE-SAFE PST LEVEL IS
PRINI*, "THE SUFE-KILL PSI LEVEL IS
                                           , SKPSI
PRINT . "THE PERCENT KILL OF MX=
                                          DEAD
PRINT*, "THE PERCENT LIVE OF MX=
                                          ", ALIVE
4 EL154
 CFE
```




Figure 8-1. Q-GERT Network




Figure 8-2. Q-GERT Network




Figure 8-3. Q-GERT Network




Figure 8-4. Q-GERT Network

Figure 8-5. Q-GERT Network

## Vita

James Thomas Moore was born on 7 April 1952 at Offutt
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Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander, missile instructor,
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